

Nesting of REDD+ Initiatives: Manual for Policy makers

Launch event





AGENDA

| TITLE | Time (EDT) | Speaker | |
|----------------------------------|------------------|---|--|
| Welcome and Introduction | 9:00 - 9:05 am | Andres Espejo, (World Bank) | |
| Overarching considerations | 9:05 – 9:20 am | Charlotte Streck (Climate Focus) Javier Cano (Climate Focus) | |
| Nesting elements | 9:20 – 10:00 am | Mercedes Fernandez (Climate Focus) | |
| Comments from REDD+ Countries | 10:00 – 10:10 am | Javier Darío Aristizabal (Dirección de Cambio Climático y Gestión del Riesgo del Ministerio de Ambiente - Colombia) | |
| Q&A | 10:10 – 10:30 am | | |




How to access to the manual and DST?

Google

FCPF webpage

WB Open Knowledge Repository





Manual and DST will be available in Spanish and French in December

HOUSEKEEPING



Keep microphone muted



Questions addressed via chat functionality in Zoom



Live interpretation available in Spanish and French



Webinar will be recorded and made available to all participants in the webinar page

https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/Nesting_of_REDD%2B_Initiatives







Thank you and enjoy!




A Manual for Nested REDD+ Systems

The purpose of the Manual is to provide countries with practical advice and guidance for developing a "nested" system for REDD+ implementation. In doing so, the Manual responds to a need driven by:

- Increasing interest in REDD+ from voluntary carbon market buyers
- Emergence of operational jurisdictional programs
- Increased interest of private buyers to invest into REDD+ programs and projects
- Opportunities to attract finance and apply various investment modalities
- Criticism regarding the environmental integrity of projects and programs



Development of REDD+







Why nest?

Objectives a country may consider when developing a nested system:

Optimize REDD+ finance

- access multiple sources of climate and carbon finance, including market and nonmarket opportunities
- enable private sector investment

Align REDD+ with the Paris Agreement

- avoid double counting of emission reductions and removals
- optimize the contribution of REDD+ to the country's NDC

Honoring the legal system and decentralized forest management

- promote REDD+ implementation at multiple scales and equity among actors participating in forest protection
- implement REDD+ in line with the existing land tenure and rights regimes

Create broad support for REDD+

- involve stakeholders on all policy levels in the design of REDD+ policies, programs and projects
- harness broad technical, financial and human capacity for REDD+ implementation

Key Policy Considerations

| Key Question | Explanation |
|--|--|
| Which actors shall be incentivized through results-based climate, or carbon finance? | Whose behavior needs to be changed? For example, in order to reduce deforestation, is it primarily government policy that is needed? Or is it perhaps private action and investment in implementing existing policies? What type of finance will be most effectively deployed, or will provide the appropriate incentives to the right actors? |
| What climate or carbon finance opportunities are most relevant for your country? | Countries may consider the types of carbon finance they wish to access—from nonmarket REDD+ results-based finance, to market-based finance, or financing from domestic, international, or voluntary markets. |
| What is the best role for the government to play with regard to REDD+? | Government engagement in markets at the national scale entails the management of a country-wide ER program as well as responsibility for implementing activities, and ultimately for performance as well. At the other end of the spectrum, a country may allow projects to proliferate without accessing REDD+ finance at the national scale. |
| What characterizes your country's rules regarding land and forest ownership? | A country's system of land tenure and ownership and forest governance will influence the type of crediting that may occur within the country. |
| What is your view of voluntary carbon projects? | In many cases, nesting is the result of existing and/or emerging voluntary forest carbon projects. In some instances, countries may wish to encourage projects, while in others they may not be allowed. |



Four models for REDD+ Nesting

Centralized Implementation Model

Crediting at national level



Jurisdictional ER program (only) with benefit sharing Key features:

- ERs credited at national scale (only)
- No forest carbon project crediting
- · Government operates ER program and distributes benefits



Incentives Focused on changing

government policies



RightsForest estate is government owned



Finance Only the government engages in markets

Benefits:

- Government has full control of ERs
- No worry about MRV mismatches
- Flexibility to channel payments to constituents
- Fewer REDD+ rules
- Simplified national accounting

- Govt has full burden to achieve results.
- No direct GHG incentives for non-state actors
- Limited carbon finance opportunities
- Relies on national capacity to implement REDD+ activities and manage ER program
- Possible litigation if benefits not provided to rights holders

Centralized nested implementation model

Crediting at national level

Project reward ER allo

Projects receive rewards based on ER allocation approach



- ERs credited up to national scale performance (only)
- Projects encouraged and receive rewards based on GHG performance (linked to national performance)
- Government control over ERs and distribution of carbon benefits via an agreed 'allocation method'



Incentives Combination of state and local action needed



Rights

Forest management (in part) licensed to non-state actors



Finance

Non-market and carbon market-based finance


Benefits:

- Government control over ER transactions
- Some incentive for local action
- No "overselling" of ERs (beyond national GHG performance)
- Government claims right to carbon

- Government remains liable for generating finance and incentives
- Private investment is stifled if project rewards depend on national GHG performance
- Risk of litigation if system does not provide full benefits to rights holders

Decentralized nested implementation model

Crediting at national level



Decentralized-nested Key features:

- ERs credited at national and project scale
- Projects authorized to generate and market ERs (delinked from national performance)
- Government generates ERs through public programs and on public lands



Incentives Combination of state and local action needed



RightsDiverse land and forest ownership



Finance Non-market and carbon market-based finance


Benefits:

- Engages private sector finance, including potential direct investment and upfront finance
- Mobilizes local action and actors
- Recognizes natural resource rights of landowners, forest communities and indigenous peoples
- Alligns national and project MRV systems

- Requires technical and institutional capacity
- Project ERs may exceed national GHG performance
- Carbon cowboys may expose the government to risks if left unregulated

Decentralized implementation model

Crediting at project scale



Project crediting (only), no jurisdictional ER program Key features:

- ERs credited at project scale (only)
- · Projects are incentivized, may be regulated
- · No RBF or sale of carbon credits by the government
- · Government role is regulator, not ER program manager



Incentives

Focused on local action and non-state actors



RightsPrivate lands with strong property rights



FinancePrivate sector focus

Benefits:

- Engages private sector finance
- May catalyze up-front investment into REDD+ activities
- Simple and low risk

- Performance limited to project areas
- Risk of inflated project crediting if not linked to national FREL
- Government does not access RBF or carbon finance

Comparison of REDD+ Models

| | Jurisdictional ER program (only) with benefit sharing | Centralized Nested Model | Decentralized Nested Model | Project Crediting (only), No Jurisdictional ER Program |
|--|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| REDD+ strategy | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Measurement, Recording, Verific | cation (MRV) | | | |
| Jurisdictional FREL | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Project level baseline and MRV | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Allocation of ERs to activities and projects | No | Yes | No | No |
| Allocation of the FREL to activities and projects | No | Yes | Yes | Optional |
| Incentives to projects via | Benefit-sharing arrangements | Sharing of jurisdictional ERs (or \$ from them) | Ability to independently generate ERs | Ability to independently generate ERs |
| Risk Management | | | | |
| Government bears the performance risks of projects | Not applicable | No | Yes | No |
| projects bear the performance risk of the government | Not applicable | Yes | No | No |


Design should be adapted to national circumstances

There is no one size fits all model...

- Countries can combine and operate elements of different models simultaneously
- Different models may be applied to different areas within the country
- Countries may transition from one model to another over time

Nesting is at an early stage of development: difficult to establish clear-cut lessons at this stage

Mixed or "hybrid" model





Carbon Accounting and MRV



Carbon Accounting and MRV Implementation of Nesting Approaches

Decentralized nested


Project Crediting (only) No Jurisdictional ER Program

Carbon Accounting and MRV Implementation of Nesting Approaches


Jurisdictional ER Program (only), with Benefit Sharing



Jurisdictional ER Program (only), with Benefit Sharing Decision Making Process




Centralized nested




Centralized nested


Decision Making Process




Decentralized nested




Decentralized nested Decision Making Procces



Project Crediting (only) No Jurisdictional ER Program



Project Crediting (only) No Jurisdictional ER Program Decision Making Process



Legal considerations



Land tenure and carbon rights

| Type of forest land tenure / natural resource regime | "Carbon right" claims | Most appropriate nesting model |
|--|--|---|
| State controlled forest land, forest resources and forest management | Carbon rights rest with the state Only the state engages in the commercialization and management of ERs. | Jurisdictional ER program (only) with benefit sharing |
| State controlled forest land with licensed management by communities and private entities | Carbon rights rest with the state The state engages in RBF or carbon finance Projects may transfer ERs if the state transfers carbon rights to private entities and communities that manage forest resources (rather than share of \$) | Centralized nested |
| Recognition of a variety of property types and diverse land management systems | Carbon rights rest both by the state and non-state (private community) entities The state engages in RBF or carbon finance Non-state actors are entitled to market and monetize carbon rights | Decentralized nested |
| Non-state entities (communities, private entities) control large parts of the forest land | Carbon rights rest both by the state and non-state (private community) entities Non-state actors control a significant percentage of land and forest resources The state does not monetize carbon rights Private actors engage in carbon projects, only projects transfer ERs | Project Crediting (only), No Jurisdictional ER Program |

Benefit sharing



Issues: Benefit sharing

| Government control over how benefits are shared | Allocation of ERs to local actors | Most appropriate model |
|--|---|---|
| Very strong, since the government is the body monetizing and managing funds received from ERs | No direct GHG-based performance incentives for local actors (Incentives can be based on proxies to performance). Incentives received through benefit sharing arrangements | Jurisdictional ER program (only) with benefit sharing |
| Strong, since government manages allocation of ERs | Incentives are based on ERs generated by projects Rewards (payments and ERs) depend on overall performance of the national program. | Centralized nested |
| Moderate, as government has more limited opportunities to generate ERs | Strong, as the structure is designed to enable direct project crediting. Incentives abased on ERs generated/monetized directly by projects. Projects have their own benefit-sharing arrangements (eventual compliance with national guidance on benefit sharing-protect local communities /IP | Decentralized nested |
| Weak, government does not directly receive benefits from ERs (but is enabling its political constituents to do so) | Strong, as the structure is designed to enable direct project crediting Compliance with national guidance on benefit sharing in order to protect local communities/IP | Project Crediting (only), No Jurisdictional ER Program |

Safeguards



Safeguards

- National environmental and social safeguards are applicable to all REDD+ activities:
 - safeguard policies should apply to national programs as well as to nested REDD+ projects
- Safeguards applicability and enforcement may differ depending on the type of nested system chosen, but mainly on how a country has defined its national safeguards system
- Governments to define how the nested projects/programs will implement and report on safeguards compliance:
 - periodicity, content of information, safeguard indicators, safeguard compliance templates, list of minimum requirements.
 - Information should be included under national System of Safeguards information
- Recognition of safeguards requirements under voluntary standards.

Safeguards

Jurisdictional ER Program (only)

• Government fully responsible for implementing/enforcing nationally defined safeguards/ensuring safeguards are followed by subnational /local-scale actors that have access to REDD+ benefits

Project Crediting (Only), No Jurisdictional Program:

- Government needs to formulate its own safeguard requirements for private and community-led projects.
- Different safeguard requirements depending on type of project/involvement of various stakeholders (IP)/location of the project

Centralized-Decentralized nested approach:

Apply both jurisdictional and project safeguard requirements



Institutional issues



Nesting implementation

| Consultations | Institutional Requirements | Regulations/ Approvals | Registries | Nesting model |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| Public consultations involving all REDD+ stakeholders take place at the national level | MRV, carbon accounting, Benefit Sharing, Safeguards tasks | No need of adoption procedures for projects. Need of legal basis for distribution of carbon finance | Simple accounting system If country only participating in nonmarket RBF: Data Management system Registry system if participating in market transactions | Jurisdictional ER program (only) with benefit sharing |
| At the national level and directly with REDD+ projects Should include technical discussions on FREL data and its use | Allocation systems (assigned emission reduction (ER) or forest reference emissions levels (FREL) need institutions designing and managing them | projects and programs (MRV rules, benefit sharing conditions, access to registry; involvement of LC/IP) Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account recording performs with private account or Third-party Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account recording performs account for Third-party Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nested project specific account for Transaction Registry (If ER issued comme ; Nes | Data management system or Transaction Registry (If ER are issued commercialized) ; Nested projects have specific accounts for recording performance | Centralized nested |
| | | | Transaction Registry with private accounts; or Third-party Transaction Registry; linking registries | Decentralized Nested |
| At REDD+ projects (discussed issues: safeguards requirements/benefit sharing.) | Safeguards, Benefit Sharing | MRV obligations by projects; safeguards, benefit sharing rules | Transaction Registry or Third-party Transaction Registry | Project Crediting (only), No Jurisdictional ER Program |

Risk management



Risk management

Jurisdictional ER Program (only), with Benefit Sharing:

- Government carries the full performance risks, dependence on national RBF
- Government should consider accessing various streams of finance to support a REDD+ strategy, including grants and budgetary resources

Centralized nested approach:

- Project financing depends on government allocation of benefits, which may result in limited project investments.
- Government could create a buffer pool and authorize ER sales by projects in case of government under-performance

Decentralized nested approach:

- Government may be overly dependent on projects in achieving REDD+ targets
- Government may approve Corresponding Adjustments only after REDD+ goals are met

Project Crediting (Only), No Jurisdictional Program:

- Government has no access to RBF or carbon finance
- Government may incentivize projects and private investments

